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 Structural Realism, Classical Realism and Human Nature 
Chris Brown 
Reading Waltz in Context 
It is, I think, generally acknowledged that Waltz’s major books are ‘modern classics’ 
– there are those who claim to see no merit in Theory of International Politics and to 
regard its success and influence as incomprehensible, but, for the most part, this is 
simply a way of expressing dislike of the ideas it contains rather than a genuine 
judgement as to its standing in the field.1  On the other hand, there are a great many 
writers who argue with greater sincerity that, while classic in its own terms, Waltzian 
realism has parted company with classical realism; indeed the name ‘neorealism’ 
implies discontinuity, and was coined (by Richard Ashley in ‘The Poverty of 
Neorealism’) precisely to make exactly this point –  possibly why Waltz himself 
prefers the term structural realism.2  What I will argue in this chapter is that this 
judgement, though in good faith, is misconceived, and that Waltz’s theory has clear 
roots in the pasts of realism.  In order to make this argument, I will first backtrack 
somewhat; if, as I suggest is the case, nearly everyone agrees that Man, The State and 
War3 and Theory of International Politics are classic texts in so far as they demand 
that anyone involved in the field must engage with them – and most also consider that 
they are classics in so far as they set a standard of excellence in the field –  then it is 
not unreasonable to treat them in the way that we might treat works of ‘classical’ 
political theory, and to pose the question ‘how are classic texts to be read’?   
 
Some post-structuralists/deconstructionists answer this question by offering what is 
sometimes called a ‘symptomatic reading’ – the locution is that of Louis Althusser, 
though the postmodern critic Frederic Jameson is a more accessible source.  In The 
Political Unconscious Jameson argues that interpretation “always presupposes, if not 
a conception of the unconscious itself, then at least some mechanism of mystification 
or repression in terms of which it would make sense to seek a latent meaning behind a 
manifest one, or to rewrite the surface categories of a text in the stronger language of 
a more fundamental interpretive code”.4  A symptomatic reading, in other words, 
pays attention to exclusions as opposed to surface content, and invites us to 
reconstruct the text to fill the gaps and silences that have been identified – an example 
is Ashley’s ‘Living on Borderlines: Man, Post-structuralism and War’ which offers a 
symptomatic reading of Man, The State and War, bringing out the ways in which the 
text escapes the control of the author, at some points privileging ‘man’ at others ‘the 
state’.5  There is something to be said for this approach; exclusions and omissions 
clearly are important and the author cannot be allowed to exercise authority over the 
interpretation of a text – but, still, such a reading is always open to the charge that one 
can make of any text whatever one wishes to.  Rather than a symptomatic reading, but 
not wholly divorced from the idea, I would prefer to approach texts along 
contextualist lines –  that is, we must read texts in contexts; more specifically, we 
must treat texts as speech-acts, and ask not just what the author is saying, but also 
what the author is doing.6  Symptoms are important here, but what this centrally 
involves is an attempt to recreate as far as possible the context within which the 
author wrote; most of all, we must not assume that an author is addressing a timeless 
set of problems, much less a set of problems that we happen to be concerned with.  
This is a very difficult task, for two reasons.  To illustrate the first, consider Quentin 
Skinner’s work on Hobbes; a prodigious scholar with a command of the relevant 
classical and early-modern languages which has rarely been equalled, Skinner is 
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probably familiar with everything that might have influenced Hobbes’s work.  
Skinner’s scholarship explicitly reflects this reading and so can claim to place Hobbes 
in his contemporary context – by following Skinner we can, in principle, see what 
worried Hobbes and what he wanted to do with his texts.  It is impossible to imaging 
this kind of depth of context being available to even the most learned and industrious 
commentators on modern writers – we can do our best, but our best is bound to fall 
short of the ideal.  
 
But there is a second, more intractable problem, which is perhaps best illustrated by a 
musical analogy.  Consider the post 1945 movement towards ‘authenticity’ in 
classical music, the attempt to recreate the conditions under which works by e.g. Bach 
and Beethoven were first performed – the use of original or replica instruments, time 
signatures and notation of the period, smaller orchestras and choirs, different layouts, 
and, in general, original performance practice based on contemporary accounts. The 
result of this movement has been to change quite radically what we understand by the 
performance of, say, a Beethoven symphony or concerto – there is a great deal more 
lightness and speed than in the rather ponderous versions that used to be common, 
period pianofortes create a much crisper sound-world, and so on; even modern 
symphony orchestras usually pick up some of these changes.  But what cannot be said 
is that we are hearing Beethoven’s symphonies the way Beethoven’s audiences would 
have heard them.  The reason for this is quite simple – we cannot wipe out the 
auditory experiences of two hundred years by an act of will.  Musically literate 
modern audiences will have heard Brahms, Wagner, Bruckner, Mahler et al, and even 
those who do not frequent the concert hall will have picked up much of the musical 
language of these composers via popular music (for example, the many film scores 
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written by Mahler’s pupils) and this will colour the way they hear Beethoven; there is 
no way this influence can be eliminated. 
 
The analogy here is, I hope, clear.  Theory of International Politics was published in 
1979.   This was before: the rapid expansion of rational-choice analysis and formal 
theory characteristic of much (US) IR of the last three decades; the framing of such 
work in terms of ‘neorealism’ and ‘liberal-institutionalism’ in the 1980s and more 
recent debates over relative versus absolute gains, offensive versus defensive realism, 
balancing strategies, soft-balancing and bandwagonning; the arrival also in the 1980s 
of the so-called Third Debate, with post-structuralist theory, Frankfurt-style Critical 
Theory, Feminism and Gender Studies making an entrance; the addition of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis to the list, and the rise of multiple varieties of constructivism in the 
1990s and 2000s; the recent revival of interest in classical and Augustinian realism, 
and the Just War tradition; the attempt to establish Carl Schmitt as a canonical figure 
in IR; the emergence of debates on global distributive justice and more widely the 
emergence of international political theory as a recognisable sub-field; and, more 
parochially, the establishment of the ‘English School’ as a putatively distinctive 
approach to IR. And all this has been in the realm of theory – the end of the Cold War 
is also worthy of note.  Of course, many of these developments were stimulated by 
readings of Waltz’s work, or developed in opposition to such readings, but the 
musical analogy holds – post-Beethovenian musical language was, one way or 
another, heavily influenced by Beethoven’s work but it still makes it impossible to 
listen to Beethoven with early nineteenth century ears.  Similarly, how are we, in 
2008, to read Waltz’s work without everything that has happened since then in the 
field influencing our judgements? 
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 The question seems to answer itself; it simply is not possible to achieve the kind of 
distance that this approach to reading a text requires – but we can at least make the 
effort, and, as it happens, I am well placed to make a shot at this task, because in 1980 
I wrote a review essay on John Burton’s Deviance Terrorism and War and Waltz’s 
Theory of International Politics, which means I can at least see how I thought about 
things then, before all the developments listed in the previous paragraph.7  Moreover, 
although about half of this essay is dedicated to Waltz, the main focus of the piece 
was on Burton, and my reading of Waltz was written sine ira et studio which makes 
it, I think, a more useful document. I may have been grinding axes, but not with a 
view to cutting down the author of Theory of International Politics.  
 
Re-reading my own text for the first time in a quarter of a century has been an 
interesting experience. The first thing it brings to light is not strictly relevant to my 
topic here, but of interest nonetheless, and that is the focus on the nature of structure 
in the first response to Waltz’s text.  As is now almost entirely forgotten, the most 
immediate response to Waltz’s argument (which was first presented in The Handbook 
of Political Science in 1975) was a philippic from Morton Kaplan, who took serious 
exception to Waltz’s critique of his conception of a ‘system’; Waltz distinguishes 
between the systems level properly conceptualised, and the level of interacting units, 
and accused Kaplan of failing to grasp this distinction in his famous text System and 
Process in International Politics.8  To my mind, and, given my interest at the time in 
structuralist and neo-Marxist theories of international relations, this was an important 
issue to me, Waltz had much the better of this debate, but was vulnerable to the 
charge that his version of structure was no more capable of showing how structure 
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was transmuted into process than Kaplan’s.  To make this point I refer in the review 
to the Marxist literature on the subject, and E.P. Thompson’s recent critique of Louis 
Althusser, The Poverty of Theory;9 Thompson suggests the need for ‘junction 
concepts’ and lays great stress on the notion of ‘experience’ – all this has quite a bit of 
resonance in terms of later constructivist thought, the agent-structure debate and, 
more recently, of critical realist theory;  interestingly, Ashley would also use 
Thompson’s work in his critique of ‘the poverty of neorealism’ in his 1984 
International Organization article. 
 
More to the point of this essay is the way in which in 1980 I understood Waltz’s 
relationship with past realist writers.  The simple answer is that I identified no great 
discontinuity here.  Due attention is paid, of course, to the fact that Waltz presents his 
argument via a Popperian account of scientific method that certainly was not to be 
found in the classic texts of realism, and that he draws a distinction between 
reductionist and systemic theories that is somewhat different from that employed by 
those texts, insofar as they employ such a distinction at all, but these points of 
difference are outweighed by the substantial similarities between his overall 
conception of the world and that of the classics.  He presents a strong and 
sophisticated account of the working assumption that states are unitary actors, a 
‘masterly’ critique of theories of interdependence (and it is indeed masterly I should 
add, still very much worth reading – especially if you substitute ‘globalisation’ for 
‘interdependence’ when the term appears in the text), and a subtle discussion of the 
balance of power – all key issues for the classical realists.  Hence my judgement then 
that Waltz remains firmly in the ‘conventional mainstream’ of realist thought. 
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So many people have subsequently disagreed with this assessment that an element of 
auto-critique may be called for here.  In my review I picked up Waltz’s use of the 
terminology of a self-help system and his use of economic models, and I critiqued his 
assumption that he was producing explanatory (as opposed to ‘metaphysical’) theory 
– but I did not anticipate that these positions would transmute into the rational-choice 
versions of neorealism subsequently popular, that the behaviour of egoistic actors 
under anarchy (the ‘anarchy problematic’) would be studied by the use of increasingly 
complex econometric models.  In my defence, I suspect Waltz himself did not 
anticipate this denouement – later statements and interviews suggests as much. 10  
 
Still, even accepting that there are elements of the argument I didn’t pick up then, it 
still seems there is a big gap between my take on Waltz’s position in 1980, and its 
later reception.  How is this gap to be explained?  In two ways, I think, one a matter of 
rhetoric, the other a matter of substance.  The rhetorical points concern, first, the way 
in which authors present themselves, and, second, the way in which they critique 
others.  As to the first point, there is a basic divide to be seen in academic 
argumentation between those who in their own work stress continuity and those who 
stress rupture.  In practice, we all stand on the shoulders of giants, as did the giants 
themselves and there is always a degree of continuity between even the most 
innovative work and past efforts in the field – the difference is whether, and to what 
degree, any particular writer is moved to acknowledge that link.  Waltz in Theory of 
International Politics is closer to the latter camp than the former; he does not make 
positive claims for great originality, but neither does he emphasise the links between 
his work and that of earlier realists (as we will see below, Man, the State and War is a 
different kind of book, and there the problem is rather of discerning when Waltz is 
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speaking in his own voice, and when he is reporting the work of others).  There is an 
interesting contrast here with, say Robert Gilpin, whose response to being identified 
as a neorealist by Richard Ashley was to deny vigorously the charge, stressing the 
way in which he represents the rich tradition of political realism.11  In the same 
collection Robert Keohane suggests that Waltz  ‘[reformulates] and systematizes 
Realism, and thus develops what I have called Structural Realism, consistently with 
the fundamental assumptions of his classical predecessors’,12  but, in his own 
response, Waltz simply does not address the issue of continuity with the past; he notes 
Richard Ashley’s charge that ‘[older] realists, despite some limitations, set a high 
standard of political reasoning from which I and other neorealists have regressed’, and 
he notes Keohane’s position cited above, but responds directly to neither charge.13  
Instead he simply sets out in detail and defends his original arguments. 
 
This insouciance is, in many ways, admirable, but it does help critics to make the 
point that his work represents a clear break with the past, if they wish to do so – and 
they often will, because this leads into the second rhetorical point about the way in 
which academics criticise each other.  A very familiar ploy here is the one Waltz 
notes in his comment on Ashley.  In order to undermine the position of an author with 
whom one disagrees quite profoundly, it is helpful to be able to make the case that 
their position does not simply contradict one’s own but also that of some 
acknowledged past masters within the author’s own discourse.  In effect, the ploy is to 
try to use people who would have been your enemies in the past to combat someone 
who is your enemy in the present.  These figures from the past are praised for their 
sagacity in order to belittle the present foe. 
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In fact, of course, this is usually little more than a rhetorical trick.  For example, 
Ashley refers favourably to E.H. Carr in the aforementioned essay as an example of 
someone who was steeped in the diplomatic culture of the past and who exhibited 
superior wisdom and judgement to Waltz, who has remained pretty firmly ensconced 
in the world of the academy.  Actually, one cannot help feeling that Carr would have 
had very little time for the kind of post-structuralist work favoured by his admirer, 
and as to Carr’s allegedly superior judgement, I suppose support for the appeasement 
of Hitler before 1939, and of  Stalin after 1945, could be described in those terms, but 
not by me – but this is beside the point, because Ashley’s invocation of Carr has very 
little to do with Carr’s work and everything to do with using him as a stick to beat 
Waltz with.  Waltz spoils the game slightly by not responding, but the very lack of a 
response does feed the predispositions of those who want to see him as instituting a 
rupture with the past. 
 
But, although this is part of the story, it is only part of the story – there is another 
reason why Waltz’s work is seem as instituting a serious break with the past and that 
concerns the much wider issue of how that past is understood.  What actually are the 
roots of realism, and is Waltz’s structuralist account actually out of line with those 
roots? The rest of this chapter is devoted to this question, and, as will become 
apparent, the matter hinges on an  examination of the role of human nature in classical 
realist thought.  The argument for a rupture between Waltzian neorealism and 
classical realism rests partly on the proposition that human nature plays less of a role 
for Waltz than it does for the classics – I want to suggest that while this is indeed the 
case, the way in which Waltz handles the issue of human nature can be related to both 
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the major strands of realist thought, although, at the same time, it is distanced from 
them. 
 
Waltz, Human Nature and the Roots of Realism 
 
The central problem for those who wish to argue against the discontinuity thesis is 
simply stated.  Waltz is absolutely clear that what he is presenting is a theory of the 
international system, and that theories based on other levels, the individual or the 
state, that is, ‘reductionist’ theories, are profoundly unsatisfactory – but, on the face of 
it, most of the authors who are usually seen as the key figures in a genealogy of 
realism offer precisely such theories. The Machiavellian tradition of raison d’état is 
essentially based on a theory about the conduct of foreign policy and rests on a 
particular conception of what human beings are like; the Hobbesian account of an 
international ‘state of nature’ again rests explicitly on an anthropology, as the 
structure of Leviathan makes very clear; the Augustinian roots of Niebuhr’s (and 
perhaps Morgenthau’s) realism are firmly embedded in the notion of original sin and 
fallen man.14   
 
Certainly one can find ‘structuralist’ positions in classical authors.  Thucydides is an 
interesting case here.  At the beginning of his history he states that the truest cause of 
the war whose story he is about to tell is ‘the one least openly expressed, that 
increasing Athenian greatness and the resulting fear among the Lacedaemonians made 
going to war inevitable’ which sounds like a clear structuralist argument (indeed an 
embryonic statement of the security dilemma).15  He makes the structuralist case more 
explicitly later in the text when he puts into the mouths of the Athenian representative 
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the proposition that they were compelled to expand their empire by necessity, and that 
the Spartans would have done the same had they been in a similar situation – the 
Athenian speech here is a nice early statement of the tenets of ‘offensive realism’. 16  
 
Waltz understandably cites these and similar passages in Thucydides – the problem is 
one can find with equal ease statements in the same source which put the real driving 
force behind the war elsewhere.  In the same speech cited above, the Athenians state, 
[we] have done nothing remarkable, nor contrary to ordinary human 
behaviour, if we not only accepted an empire when it was offered but also did 
not let it go, submitting to the great forces of prestige, fear and self-interest – 
not as the originators of such conduct, moreover, since the rule has always 
existed that the weaker is held down by the stronger…17
Later, the Athenians make the same point in the ‘Melian Dialogue’. 
According to our understanding, divinity, it would seem, and mankind, as has 
always been obvious, are under an innate compulsion to rule whenever 
empowered.18
Human nature is the driving force, to which individuals and peoples must submit, are 
under an innate compulsion.   
 
The other classical writer favoured by structural realists is Rousseau, whose parable 
of the stag hunt is a staple for students of rational choice and the logic (and dilemmas) 
of collective action.  Thus.. 
If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain 
faithfully at his post; but if a hare happened to pass within the reach of one of 
them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without 
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scruple and, having caught his own prey, he would have cared very little about 
having caused his companions to lose theirs. 19
This is frequently used to illustrate the imperatives of a self-help system; ‘everyone’ 
would behave in this way because everyone would behave in this way – in other 
words we have to assume that if we don’t chase the hare someone else will, or if we 
are the only person who has seen the hare and so this does not apply, we have to 
assume that there may be another hare which someone else will see and chase and so 
on.  Either way the stag will be lost and we will go hungry, so we had better act now.  
But, again, it is the assumptions that Rousseau makes about human nature that do the 
work in this case; it is because human beings are unscrupulous in the pursuit of their 
own interests, and have little concern for the interests of others that they act in this 
way. 20
 
In short, both Thucydides and Rousseau are ultimately offering first-image accounts 
of the motor of realism – and they are the best friends Waltz can find within the 
classical literature on the subject.  For Augustine and the Augustinians, ancient and 
modern, political leaders are obliged to operate in a fallen world – the city of man as 
opposed to the city of God – and therefore must be wise and prudential (also, it is to 
be hoped, just) wielders of power, and this has nothing to do with structural features 
of the international politics of late antiquity (or the early 21st century); for Augustine, 
the hierarchical polity that was collapsing around his ears was as much a context as 
the incipient anarchical system being created by the barbarian tribes who were 
overrunning the Empire.21 Again, Machiavelli simply takes it for granted that politics 
is about the pursuit of interests; thus, the unstated assumption is that the Duke 
Valentino seeks to extend his power simply because he can – no further explanation is 
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required – and if you want to preserve your power, or that of the city, (The Prince) or 
to preserve republican forms of government (The Discourses) you had better be aware 
that this is the way of the world. 
 
Without labouring the point further, I suggest a key feature of Waltz’s thought and 
one that genuinely distinguishes it from classical realism, is that his theory of 
international politics is not derived from a theory of human nature, or even explicitly 
in reaction to a theory of human nature – indeed ‘human nature’ does not even appear 
in the index of Theory of International Politics. In Man, the State and War, of course, 
it does appear but of the three images set out therein, the first two (‘man’ and ‘the 
state’) are collapsed into one category in Theory of International Politics, 
‘reductionism’. Interestingly, when he wants to illustrate the follies of this way of 
thinking, it is to a theory of foreign policy (Lenin’s theory of imperialism) that he 
turns, and not to a theory of human nature.  Why so?  
 
For the answer to this question we have to examine the complex picture of human 
nature actually presented in Man, the State and War.  This is not as easy as it might be 
thought to be, because – unlike Theory of International Politics – this is a book that is 
built round a series of interlocking debates between different authors, classical and 
modern, and it is not always as clear as it might be what Waltz himself thinks on the 
subject.  So, for example, at the outset of  Man, the State and War we have the bald 
statement ‘[our] miseries are ineluctably the product of our natures. The root of all 
evil is man, and thus he himself is the root of the specific evil, war’ (p.3) which 
Freyberg-Inan in her generally excellent book on realism and human nature takes to 
be an expression of Waltz’s own view; she comments, correctly, that in this he sounds 
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like St Augustine.22  The problem is that while Waltz may indeed endorse this 
position, it actually occurs in the course of a discussion of precisely the Augustinian 
perspective that it is supposed to resemble, and it could well be (probably is) simply a 
summary of that position.  If it is Waltz’s view then the use of the term evil is 
interesting here, adding an unexpected theological dimension to what is otherwise, as 
noted above, a frequently expressed realist position, but, in any event, what is more 
significant is that it is clear from the rest of the book that Waltz believes that this sort 
of generalisation about human nature actually gets us nowhere, and a different kind of 
explanation for war is needed.  Why? Given the general thrust of his argument 
elsewhere, one might have expected him to argue that because human nature is a 
constant it cannot explain war; war is the product of a particular set of social 
arrangements and must be understood in that context, reductionist theories will not do, 
and so we must move to the third image.  Had he taken such a route he would have 
aligned himself with those realist writers who emphasise an unchanging human nature 
(Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes) even if, unlike those predecessors, he doesn’t 
think that ultimately this nature matters very much. 
 
But, it seems, that this is actually not why he moves away from human nature.  
Rather, it is first, because, in any scientific sense, the content of human nature is 
unknowable, but second, and more important, it is because, contra the position 
outlined above, human nature is actually a variable, not a constant.  Thus, ‘[Because] 
of the difficulty of knowing such a thing as a pure human nature, because the human 
nature we do know reflects both man’s nature and the influence of his environment, 
definitions of human nature such as those of Spinoza and Hobbes are arbitrary and 
can lead to no valid social or political conclusions.’ (p.166) 23  Here Waltz is 
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discussing the critique of these accounts of human nature allegedly put forward by 
Montesquieu and Rousseau, but it is, I think, clear from the context that he is 
endorsing this position.24 Reconstructing and rearranging his argument, it seems to be 
that while we humans do indeed have a nature, and, perhaps, judging from the 
existence of evil in the world, that nature is such that sometimes evil consequences 
flow from it, we can’t actually specify this nature much beyond that, at least not in 
any scientific way, and, in any event, in practice, nature and nurture cannot be treated 
separately; therefore an emphasis on human nature gets us nowhere if we want to 
understand social phenomena.   
 
This is quite a complex position, which touches base with the major strands of 
classical realist thought, but at a tangent.  The initial emphasis on evil, if it were to be 
the case that this is indeed his emphasis, would link Waltz to the ‘righteous realists’, 
the Augustinian strand of thought identified by Joel Rosenthal, Alastair Murray and 
others.25  But the Augustinians actually draw political conclusions from this position; 
their realism is a realism of prudence, where we are enjoined to question our own 
presuppositions and values (because we are fallen beings every bit as much as are our 
enemies), and to turn away from ambitious projects of social reform, which are 
doomed to failure because of the imperfect human material from which societies are 
constructed – human beings may strive to be moral (although, for Augustine, they can 
only achieve this status by God’s grace, not by their own efforts), but collectivities 
will always be egoistic.26 There is, I suspect, little here with which in practice Waltz 
would disagree (which is one of the reasons why Freyberg-Inan might be right in 
assigning the ‘evil’ statement to him) but he does not get to this position by the 
Augustinian route, even if he has the same starting point.  From his perspective, and 
 15
given his commitment to social science, and to a particular version of what social 
science involves, the Augustinian route leads into a dead end.  In the terminology of 
Theory of International Politics this is metaphysics and he, Waltz, is engaged in 
science.  One cannot build a model on this kind of foundation, even if the foundation 
is, in some sense, sound; Augustinian realism does not generate testable hypotheses 
and ultimately it remains a branch of belles-lettres.  From a Waltzian perspective this 
is also, I think, the problem with Morgenthau’s theory – Morgenthau wants to be 
objective and present scientific laws of politics, but his metaphysical commitments 
get in the way, although, for many, of course, it is Morgenthau’s so-called 
‘metaphysics’, his critique of positivism, as set out in e.g. Scientific Man vs. Power 
Politics that is his most attractive feature.27  In short, Waltz is not an Augustinian 
realist, even if he shares some of the pessimism characteristic of that genre. 
 
Neither does he follow Hobbes, Spinoza, Machiavelli et al by rooting his theory in the 
drives produced by an unchanging human nature. But, again, there are points of 
contact with this strand of realism; he may not see human nature as constant, but he 
does, I think, share with these authors the view that the interests of states, which are 
ultimately generated by human nature, are, more or less, constant – the difference 
being that from his perspective these interests have to be seen as exogenous to a 
theory of the international system.  States desire to survive and it is this desire which 
leads them to arms-race, or form balances or whatever; we don’t need to ask why 
states desire to survive, they just do.  From his perspective, to push the question 
further takes us into areas which it is not reasonable to expect a theory of the 
international system to be concerned with.  It is this approach to interests – as constant 
but exogenous – which has dominated the thought of the ‘rational choice realists’ who 
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have built on Waltz’s work to construct modern neorealism by redefining the field as 
the study of how egoists pursue their exogenously given interests under conditions of 
anarchy– and indeed of their cousins, the liberal institutionalists who have offered a 
different reading of the possibilities of the anarchy problematic, but take the same 
view of interests, (or ‘preferences’ as Andrew Moravcsik would have it).28  And, of 
course, it is this position that has been so effectively criticised by constructivist 
writers such as Friedrich Kratochwil and Harald Müller;29 values and interests should 
not be taken as given but must be understood as produced in discourse, that is, 
produced in a relationship – as Kratochwil puts it, one root of the word ‘interest’ is 
‘inter-esse’, ‘ the in-between of the me and the you’.30  On this account, it simply 
isn’t possible to produce a theory of international politics that is isolated from other 
levels of social and inter-personal interaction. 
 
Still, without remotely wishing to suggest that Waltz is a proto-constructivist, it seems 
to me that there are elements of his thinking that would be rather more compatible 
with this critique than one might expect; the aspects of the work of the neorealists and 
liberal institutionalists criticised by Kratochwil actually owe more to the Hobbesian 
account of human nature than they do to the more nuanced story that Waltz has to tell.  
Indeed, when Waltz writes of man’s nature interacting with his environment, one 
could almost imagine this thought being developed in the direction of Alexander 
Wendt’s account of the different kinds of anarchy that might emerge in different kinds 
of environments31 – but, of course, Waltz does not wish to go anywhere near that 
position, rejecting altogether any this line of thought that relies on human nature. The 
point is that he excludes human nature because we can’t (or at least don’t) understand 
it, whereas the rational choice realists treat it as an exogenous variable because they 
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believe that they do understand it, and that it generates interests the nature of which 
can simply be taken for granted.  But, on the other hand, for Waltz although we can’t 
(or at least don’t) understand human nature, we do at least know that it is quite likely 
that ‘our miseries are the product of our natures’, which takes us back to Augustinian 
pessimism and away from both the rational choice realists and the constructivists.  
Waltz’s thought seems to oscillate between the Hobbesian and Augustinian poles, 
touching both while refusing to be identified with either.  
 
Here, I suggest, is perhaps the most important, and certainly the most paradoxical, 
reason why Waltz is so difficult to relate to the roots of  realism; it is not because he is 
totally separated from those roots, but because he is actually implicated in too many 
of them.  Whereas we can settle for a Weberian (modified Nietzschean) reading of 
Morgenthau and, I would argue, perhaps controversially, a Hobbesian (out of Marx 
and Mannheim) reading of Carr, no such shorthand is available to us to summarise 
Waltz’s position.  Easiest simply to say that there is a rupture here, that Waltz really is 
the inventor of something called ‘neorealism’, a doctrine which has lost touch with 
past realist thought.  Easiest perhaps, but inaccurate I think – better would be to say 
that finding a shorthand reading of Waltz that relates to the realist past is difficult 
because there is too much to say rather than too little. 
 
Returning to the issue of human nature, so far I have tried to describe Waltz’s position 
– but some degree of assessment of that position is also called for.  Was he right to 
see human nature as essentially unknowable, and variable in its impact? When Waltz 
was developing his thoughts on structural realism in the 1970s, human socio-biology 
was in its infancy, and the first serious attempt by a scholar to talk about human 
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nature in a scientifically defensible way – Edward O. Wilson’s Sociobiology: The 
New Synthesis  – was as unpopular with biologists as it was with sociologists and 
anthropologists, and gave no reason for Waltz to change his judgement that there was 
nothing useful that a social scientist could say about the subject. 32 Indeed, the most 
trenchant critique of the scientific pretentions of socio-biology, by Marshall Sahlins, 
rejected the discourse on roughly the same, Durkheimian, grounds offered by Waltz 
for rejecting other kinds of ‘reductionist theories.33  Since the 1970s, however, socio-
biology, rebranded as ‘evolutionary psychology’, has developed in ways that are far 
removed from the simplicities of Wilson’s work, and now, I believe, demands to be 
taken seriously.34  Moreover, neuroscientists such as V. S.  Ramachandran and 
Antonio Damasio are revealing ways in which human perceptions and behaviours are 
crucially shaped and determined by physical processes within the brain.35  And, to 
complete the picture, many cultural anthropologists are now rejecting the politically-
correct relativism of their disciplinary forebears – perhaps rather disappointingly, it 
turns out that the ‘coming of age on Samoa’ was more or less like the coming of age 
everywhere else, and Donald Brown has proved that one can write a very substantial 
book full of ‘human universals’.36  Add all this material together and although we 
may not know of such a thing as a ‘pure human nature’, we (that is, the scientific 
community, broadly drawn) do know a lot more about the subject than we did thirty 
years ago. Does this have any implications for Waltz’s position? 
 
Scholars of international relations have been slow in coming to terms with this 
material, and probably the best-known work, by Bradley Thayer, is broadly 
supportive of rational-choice, game theoretic approaches.37  More recent work, 
however, focuses on the ways in which choices are made that are not utility 
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maximising.38  The results here are rather sobering; for example, there is good 
evidence that mentally healthy people tend to exhibit psychological biases that 
encourage optimism; such biases, known to evolutionary psychologists as ‘positive 
illusions’, may well have been adaptive in helping our ancestors to cope with hard 
times, but nowadays may serve instead to get us into trouble.39  
 
It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of this work for international 
political theory, and I hope to write more extensively on this topic in the future, but 
obviously, any serious assessment would take us far beyond the scope of this 
particular article – still, it is interesting to ask whether, if it is indeed the case that we 
can now say rather more about human nature than we could in the 1970s, as I think it 
is, does what we can now say actually support the position Waltz’s took in Theory of 
International Politics?  Was Waltz right to resist basing his theory on human nature?  
The answer, I think, is a tentative yes.  Scientific work in this field has indeed 
identified biases in judgement some of which are relevant to any theory of foreign 
policy behaviour – but, of course, Waltz had no intention of producing such a theory.  
At the macro level where he was working, the most relevant finding of the new 
learning is rather different.  It is precisely that while there may be identifiable human 
behavioural biases and mechanisms that are the product of evolution and are constant 
across cultures and over time, the idea that human nature as such is a constant is not 
defensible.  In the study quoted above, ‘positive illusions’ were present generally in 
all populations, but they varied in intensity as between individuals; mental states are 
important and, unsurprisingly, depressed people were less likely to have positive 
illusions that mentally healthy people; context is central – positive illusions are 
greater, for example, ‘in situations of ambiguity, low feedback, and where events are 
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difficult to verify’; culture matters, ‘positive illusions are greater among Western 
(especially American) populations than Eastern populations’ (we might have guessed 
that one as well) and, finally, they vary according to regime type and decision making 
process.40 The point is that it is precisely because of these variations that it is possible 
to put together a theory which is intended to predict when positive illusions will be 
important – this is the goal of Dominic Johnson’s recent book.41  If there were to be 
such a thing as a constant ‘human nature’ it could not be the basis for theory, which is 
precisely why Waltz was right not to construct his theory on such foundations, even if 
this meant that, in this respect, he had to part company with his illustrious forebears. 
 
So, to return to the starting point of this chapter, how then should we read Waltz – as 
one in a line of realist theorists whose work is consistent with the ‘fundamental 
assumptions of his classical predecessors’ or as a figure who has broken with the 
past?  The answer is ‘both and’ rather than ‘either or’.  It is impossible to find any 
figure amongst the classics who puts things together in the same way that Waltz does, 
but most of the things that are put together by Waltz would be familiar to most 
classical writers.  And this ability to take familiar material and to combine and 
recombine it is precisely why Waltz is an undisputed modern classic.   
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